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CHAPTER I1 
NORTH KOREA IN TRANSITION 
1. The Land Reform 
Toward the end of Japanese rule, a wide disparity existed between lands 
held by peasants, who formed the majority of the rural population, and lands 
held by landlords. According to a survey conducted by the Japanese in 1942 
(quoted in KO Sung-hyo 1971:2), the landlord households, which composed 
only 3.3% of rural households, owned 60% of the land under cultivation in 
Korea, composed of 68.3% of the highly productive irrigated lands and 
52.4% of the less productive dry fields. About 80% of rural households either 
owned no land or held at least part of their land as tenants. 
The size of the average landholding in Korea was 1.5 chongbo (one 
chongbo equals 2.45 acres) (ibid.:3). In 1938, among households that either 
lacked land or rented at least part of their land, over 60% held less than one 
chongbo, and well over one-third held less than one-half chongbo. The bulk 
of land under cultivation was held by a relatively small number of Korean 
and Japanese landlords and a handful of large Japanese corporations. 
According to 1936 statistics, 2,330 landlords and corporations held over 50 
chongbo each, of which 67.4% were Korean and 32.2% Japanese. The larger 
the scale of landholding, the higher was the proportion of Japanese owners. 
For example, over half (52.8%) of the landlords with over 100 chongbo and 
78.7% of those with over 200 were Japanese. Twenty-five Japanese landlords 
held over 1,000 chongbo each, whereas only ten Koreans owned that much. A 
few Japanese corporations played the role of colonial agents in Korea; among 
these the Toyo Takushoku Company with 50,000 chongbo, the Chosen Kogyo 
Company with 19,000, and the Chosen Shintaku Company with 9,000 had 
the largest holdings. The total area of land held by Japanese companies and 
individuals, and by the Japanese government, however, was only 11.3%. 
Shortly after the Japanese formally took power in Korea, they conducted 
under the pretext of confirmation of land ownership a nationwide land 
survey, which was completed in 1918. Until the end of the Yi Dynasty all land 
had been nominally owned by the government, and only the right to collect 
revenue from crops had been recognized, for certain lands. The lands on 
which this right obtained were held by the Korean aristocracy, bureaucrats, 
and members of local privileged classes, and the Japanese allowed these 
people to keep their lands as private property. The land survey was 
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conducted as a preliminary step before utilizing the remaining land to 
support the Japanese economy. The land survey and other Japanese colonial 
policies, however, had little impact on the traditional Korean class system. 
The colonialists carefully tried to avoid any confrontation with the ruling 
class in Korea. The former privileged class was thus allowed to retain its 
wealth, and the majority of the peasant population was left without land and 
remained as tenants. 
The fact that the northern half of Korea alone went under Communist 
rule does not mean that the peasant life in northern Korea under Japanese 
domination had been much harder than in the south. In fact, there is some 
evidence that the peasants in the north may have been somewhat better off: 
"In the north the dry fields prevail, while the south contains irrigated lands, 
the yields of which are almost double the yields of dry fields" (Grajdanzev 
1945282). Almost two-thirds of the dry fields of Korea were in the north, 
whereas 73% of the irrigated lands were in the south. The high productivity 
in the south had led in all probability to more intensive exploitation of both 
lands and tenants by the landlords and Japanese colonialists, As compared 
with owner-households, the proportion of landless households, either tenants 
or agricultural laborers, was much smaller in the north (46.4%) than in the 
south (60.4%), whereas the proportion of households owning at least part of 
the land they cultivated was higher in the north (48.2%) than in the south 
(38.8%) (ibid.), The size of landholdings was much larger in the north. 
According to Grajdanzev, during 1934-1936 over one-fourth of the 
households in the south had less than one chongbo of land under cultivation, 
versus 35% in the north. These data contrast sharply with statistics on 
middle- and large-size farms. Only 1.6% of the farming households in the 
south held more than 3 chongbo, whereas 15.1% of those in the north fell in 
the same class. Thus economic hardships experienced by peasants before the 
end of the Japanese rule in 1945 are likely to have been less acute in the north 
than in the south. 
When the northern half of Korea became Communist, over 111,000 
chongbo of its arable lands were owned by the Japanese government or by 
Japanese nationals and corporations. For the Communists, one of the most 
urgent tasks in winning popular support from the vast majority of poor 
peasants who had lived so long under straitened circumstances was land 
reform. Many of the landlords with large holdings, Korean as well as 
Japanese, were absentee owners who lived in the cities, especially the capital 
city of Seoul in the south, and collected rents through agents. Fearing the 
Communists, many fled south even before the land reform actually began in 
North Korea. "After these landowners had gone," according to Washburn 
(1947: 156), "the landless peasants in a number of places seized the discarded 
fields and divided them among themselves." 
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On March 5, 1946, the North Korean Interim People's Committee, 
adopting the proposal of land reform of the Peasants Federation, passed an 
ordinance on land reform. The major principle underlying the reform was 
"land to the tillers," entirely abolishing tenancy. According to the ordinance 
(for English text, see U. N. 1951:59, or Korea Today, 1972, No. 189:16-17), 
the following categories of land were subject to confiscation and were to be 
given without charge to peasants with little or no land: 1) land possessed by 
the government, civilians, and organizations of Japan; 2) land owned by 
national traitors, that is, those who collaborated with the Japanese 
colonialists; 3) land owned by those who fled after the liberation; 4) land 
owned by Korean landlords in excess of five chongbo per farming household; 
5) land owned by absentee landlords; 6) land rented out continuously for 
many years, regardless of size; and 7) land owned by churches, monasteries, 
and other religious organizations in excess of five chongbo. 
Land confiscated and redistributed to the peasants was to be "owned 
permanently." It should be noted, however, that "permanent ownership" of 
redistributed land is quite different from "private ownership." The 
ordinance further stipulated that, after the redistribution, land could not be 
sold, rented, or mortgaged. The peasants were given certificates of land 
ownership for their newly acquired lands by the provincial government, that 
is, the Provincial People's Committee. These certificates did not recognize 
private ownership of the land, but were designed to guard against further 
transactions in land. 
The land reform ordinance also extended to other major aspects of the 
rural economy of pre-Communist Korea. All debts owed by peasants to 
landlords whose lands were subject to confiscation and redistribution as well 
as liabilities on such lands were annulled; cattle, agricultural implements, 
and houses formerly owned by these landlords were to be confiscated; 
orchards and fruit trees possessed by the Japanese and the Korean landlords 
were also to be confiscated; irrigation facilities owned by those whose lands 
were subject to confiscation were to be turned over to the state; and all 
forests, except small areas owned by peasants, were to be confiscated and 
turned over to the state. 
Finally, the land reform ordinance stipulated that, under the guidance 
of the North Korean Interim People's Committee, the Provincial, County, 
and District (Myan, now abolished) People's Committees assume re- 
sponsibility for enforcement of the land reform program on the different 
administrative levels. On the village level, responsibility was to be assumed by 
the Agrarian Committee, to be elected by a general assembly of agricultural 
workers, tenants, and independent peasants with little land. 
Landlords were not only deprived of their land and all other private 
property related to agricultural production, they were also entirely eliminated 
from the executive body enforcing the land reform. If landlords desired to 
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work land themselves, they could hold the same amount as peasants, but they 
were given land only "in other counties." This appears to have been an 
attempt to take away the power formerly held by landlords, and also to avoid 
any possible conflict between landlords and their former tenants. It is 
difficult to determine how many landlords lost their lands. Official North 
Korean statistics list under the category of landlords with more than five 
chongbo per household 29,683 households whose lands were confiscated. The 
same source, however, lists only 3,911 landlord households that moved into 
new localities and received land (see tables 1 and 2). These figures lead to a 
question about the fate of the vast majority of landlords deprived of their 
lands and other property who received no land at the time of redistribution. 
No clear data to answer this question are available. In all probability many 
took refuge in the south or were forced to move into urban areas as non- 
agricultural workers. 
Instructions on the redistribution of confiscated lands provided that the 
size of allotments be based on the number of household members and their 
ability to work as determined by their age. Each member of a household to 
receive land was rated according to age. A rating of 1.0 point was given for 
men of 18 to 60 years and women of 18 to 50 years; 0.7 point for children of 
15 to 17 years; 0.4 point for children of 10 to 14 years; 0.1 point for children 
under 10 years; and 0.3 point for men over 60 and women over 50. The value 
of a point was not the same in every locality or village, however, since the 
ratio of confiscated land to the number of eligible people varied according to 
locality, After the Agrarian Committee completed the confiscation of land 
and the tabulation of points for each household, the Committee determined 
the value of a point by dividing the total area of land available for 
redistribution by the total number of points per village. Therefore, the size of 
the allotment of each household was determined by the total number of 
points of the household multiplied by the value of a point. The productivity of 
land was taken into account in redistribution insofar as possible. As 
determined by these procedures, the changes brought by the land reform may 
be seen in tables 1 and 2. 
As the figures in the tables indicate, approximately one-half of the 
1,860,000 chongbo of arable land in North Korea in 1946 was involved in the 
reform. Over 60% of the confiscated land came from peasant households 
with medium-sized holdings that had owned no more than 5 chongbo but 
had rented out part or all of their land. As noted earlier, the proportion of 
land formerly possessed by Japanese was 11.3%. No comparable data are 
available for South Korea, but, as has already been suggested, it appears that 
North Korea was less exposed to exploitation by Japanese colonialists than 
southern Korea, probably due to its own geographical disadvantages of lower 
productivity, a lower proportion of irrigated to dry fields, and mountainous 
terrain. 
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TABLE 1 
CONFISCATED LAND, 1946% 
Total Area No. of Average Area 
Owners of Land (chongbo) Cases** per Case 
Japanese government and nationals 111,561 
National traitors and deserters 12,518 
Landlords with over 5 chongbo 231,716 
Those who rent all of their land 259,150 
Those who continuously rent their land 354,093 
Churches, monasteries, and other religious groups 14,916 
*Orchards are excluded in this table. 
**This may be households, corporations, or other social units. 
TABLE 2 
REDISTRIBUTIONOF CONFISCATED LAND, 1946 
Recipients 
Area No. of Average 
(chongbo) Households Allotment 
Agricultural laborers 
Tenants without land 
Peasants with little land 
Landlords who relocated 
Land reserved by the People's Committee 18,885 
TOTAL 983,954 
Source: Chosen MinshushugiJinrnin Kyowakoku Kokurnin Keizai Hatten Tokeishu, 1946-1960 
(Statistical Returns of National Economy of the Democratic People's Repubiic of Korea, 1946- 
1960) (Japanese edition by the Central Statistics Bureau, State Planning Commission of the 
D.P.R.K.), Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 196157-58. 
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It  appears that "national traitors" and deserters were the largest 
category of landholders whose land was confiscated. The majority of those 
who were classified as national traitors were Koreans who had made large 
fortunes through collaboration with Japanese colonial authorities. The 
average size of holdings confiscated from national traitors and deserters was 
9.09 chongbo. 
Nearly one million chongbo of confiscated land were redistributed, and 
less than 2% was placed under state ownership. Each household received an 
average of 1.33 chongbo of arable land. A close look at figures on average 
allotments by recipient classes (table 2) raises a question concerning the 
reasons for the marked difference in average allotments to former poor 
peasants and to landlords. Landlords were given almost twice the amount 
received by the average agricultural laborer. The official North Korean 
source of data on the land reform gives no explanation. Two factors may have 
influenced the amount of the allotments. Since the amount of land was based 
upon the point system tabulated by the age and sex of each household 
member, differences in the average size of landlord and peasant households 
might explain the differences. Since the low income of the agricultural 
laborers could not support large households, they tended to have relatively 
small families. In pre-Communist times, it was not uncommon for poor but 
able-bodied men to leave their homes and families to seek employment as 
agricultural laborers in other localities. I t  was quite rare for agricultural 
laborers to form households larger than the nuclear family. Conversely, the 
families of the well-to-do tended to be relatively large and to include kin 
beyond the members of the nuclear family. The quality or productivity of 
land may also have been influential in determining the size of these 
allotments of land. The peasants remained in their native villages, but the 
landlord class had to move to new localities where the soil was of poor quality 
or was, in many cases, virgin land. Larger allotments of inferior quality to the 
landlord class seem to have been balanced by the lower average allotments of 
land of higher quality to the former peasants. Regardless of differences in 
average allotments according to former socio-economic status, the size of 
average landholdings was small. 
There is no doubt that the land reform substantially changed the social 
structure of North Korea. The former landless peasants were given land of 
their own and a strong voice in village affairs, whereas well-to-do families lost 
virtually all of the political power they had long exercised. Although the land 
reform brought about the abolition of the traditional class system, which was 
largely based upon the ownership of private property, it did not achieve a 
society that was truly egalitarian in economic opportunities, since it allowed 
differences in the size of landholdings among peasant households in the same 
village. No ceiling in the size of landholdings was set forth in the reform 
program at the time. Since confiscation did not apply to land that was 
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cultivated by its owners, a class of "new rich peasants" began to emerge a few 
years after the reform. Unlike the former landlords, the former middle-class 
peasants who owned more than five chongbo of arable land but tilled it 
themselves were allowed to keep their land. The holdings of the former 
middle-class peasants were much larger than the average allotment of 1.33 
chongbo per household. Owner-farmers were also allowed to keep necessary 
means of production such as draft animals, ox carts, and other agricultural 
instruments. Landholders who now had relatively large plots of land of 
good quality-so-called munjon-oktap, or fertile fields near their houses 
-undoubtedly held an economic advantage over others. 
Although tenancy had been formally abolished by the land reform, there 
was still room for exploitation of poor peasants by the "new rich peasants." 
The owners of Iarge holdings managed their farming through lending draft 
animals and agricultural instruments to poor peasants in exchange for labor, 
which had been common practice in pre-Communist years. In this way, it was 
still possible to operate large holdings without violating the ordinance 
prohibiting tenancy, but, since land was no longer subject to sale or 
purchase, no expansion of holdings was possible. Some well-to-do families 
practiced usury, lending grain to poor peasants who were out of food well 
before the next harvest, under agreements that the latter return the same 
amount of grain plus substantial interest after harvest (Kajimura 1966a:305- 
306). An official North Korean statement tells us: 
The land reform dealt a severe blow to rich peasants, but they stilI remained as a 
class. Accordingly, expIoitation in various forms was to be seen in the countryside, 
and new rich peasants emerged, although small in number. Some peasants who 
became rich after the land reform would practice usury, hire workers instead of 
doing their jobs themselves, and indulge in the worst type of profit seeking 
(Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., 1958:16; also quoted in Lee 
1962: 13). 
The activities of large landholders were somewhat restricted in late 1948. 
The North Korean Constitution, adopted and promulgated in September 
1948, provided that size of landholdings could not exceed five chongbo in the 
plains or twenty chongbo in mountainous regions (Article 6). A program of 
reexamination of landholdings then took place in rural North Korea and, in 
accordance with the new regulations, certificates of land ownership were 
withdrawn and reissued. 
For most peasants, the initial land reform ordinance was not surprising 
at all. It was what they had expected after the Communist take-over. The 
mobilizing force was the Peasants Federation (Nongmin Tongmaeng), newly 
organized among the poor peasants toward the end of 1945. In order to carry 
out the land reform with the least possible disturbance and resistance, 
trained cadres were dispatched from the central government into each 
village. Although the reform had been executed in the name of peasants, 
these cadres supervised and directed the entire procedure. Confiscating the 
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properties possessed by the Japanese presented no problem, but the land 
reform ordinance was met by strong resistance from the landlords and 
wealthy families. In order to minimize and weaken potential resistance, the 
regime encouraged each village to ostracize rich landlords. "Some landlords, 
who were besieged by excited peasants, deserted their native villages, and 
some opened their stores of grain to the peasants and begged the latter's 
pardon" (Hwang et al. 1960:205). For example, three landlords in the 
Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative in Sangyang hamlet, 
whose confiscated lands each exceeded five chongbo and who were suspected 
of possible "reactionary influence," were ostracized and forced into 
relocating (ibid. :206). 
The entire land reform of 1946 was reportedly completed throughout 
rural North Korea in only about twenty days. As a result, the geographic and 
social movement of the North Korean population apparently reached its peak 
during and shortly after this time. There was no reason for the poor peasants 
to leave their native villages since they had moved up to the status of a 
somewhat privileged class, economically and politically. But fear of the 
possible acts of the local Communist authorities and the former lower class 
had led thousands of wealthy families to desert their homes. No doubt the 
majority of them fled to South Korea. The United Nations Temporary 
Commission on Korea estimated that 1,116,600 North Korean nationals had 
taken refuge in South Korea by the end of 1947 (U.N. 1948:I-23). Another 
report (Choson Unhaeng Chosa-bu 1948:I-9). gives the estimated number of 
refugees in South Korea during the same period as 803,434. Among these, 
185,441 were reported to have left North Korea in 1946, and 165,074 in 1947. 
TABLE 3 
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF REFUGEES BY MONTH, 1946 
January. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13,306 July . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8,212 
February . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20,437 August.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4,739 
March.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34,670 September. ................. 2,234 
April.. .................... 50,450 October. ................... 2,997 
May.. ..................... 25,818 November . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4,740 
June . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17,203 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  635 
Total . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  185,441 
Source: Adapted from Choson kyongje nyonbo, by Choson Unhaeng Chosa-bu (ed.), Seoul: 
Choson Unhaeng 1948:I-9. 
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From these reports it seems clear that the majority of refugees had 
already deserted their homes in North Korea and fled into the south well 
before the actual land reform started. The statistics of table 3 help 
demonstrate the impact of the land reform ordinance on the flow of North 
Koreans to the south. As this table shows, the number of refugees greatly 
increased during the month of the land reform. The following month of April 
1946 saw the greatest flow of refugees during a single month. From March 
through May, over 100,000 North Koreans took refuge in the south. 
2. Cooperativization 
Although the former landlord class had been largely removed from the 
scene by the land reform and the lot of poor peasants had improved, as we 
have earlier noted, North Korea was not yet an egalitarian society because the 
former middle class had gained economic strength. The land confiscated and 
redistributed in accord with the land reform ordinance was neither 
nationalized nor put into private ownership. To some extent, it can be said 
that the peasants' newly-acquired land was under de jure private ownership 
but de facto state ownership. The land reform had only cleared the way for 
further consolidation of rural economic organization; that is, the reform was 
the first step toward the "agricultural cooperativization" that was to follow. 
Since land could not be sold, the regime was in no hurry to conduct further 
reorganization of the rural economy and focused its attention next on 
increasing production. The North Korean Constitution (Article 9), 
promulgated in 1948, provided that the cooperative management of rural 
economy be introduced and encouraged, but this did not materialize until 
after the Korean War (1950-1953). 
A decree of December 1949 provided for the formation of state farms, 
Absorbing the land reserved as state property during the initial land reform, 
the newly established state farms, provincial and central-governmental, were 
designed to demonstrate the "superiority" of collective management of rural 
economy. They served as forerunners for future cooperativization and 
experimentation with various other aspects of rural economy. During the 
Korean War, rural North Korea suffered a severe shortage of labor. All able- 
bodied men were mobilized for military service, leaving principally old men, 
women, and children in the villages. To meet the labor shortage, the 
government encouraged the peasants to organize a number of mutual aid 
groups. These were called chonson kongdong chagoptae (front joint work 
teams),pumasi-ban (mutual aid groups), sogyoli-ban (ox sharing teams), and 
puop hyopdong chohap (side-line or subsidiary cooperatives). The "front 
joint work teams" reportedly prevailed near the war front, especially in 
Kangwon Province, the eastern front. The members of these teams, which 
cultivated land cooperatively and also actively assisted at the war front, were 
principally young people whose families had been evacuated to places of 
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safety. Sizes of teams ranged from fifty to two hundred persons (Kim Han-ju 
1958: 14). 
The pumasi-ban, or mutual aid group, had long been common in 
traditional rural Korea. As a temporary work organization among 
neighboring villagers, it was active during the peak seasons of agricultural 
work, including seeding, rice transplanting, weeding, and harvesting. The 
"ox sharing teams" were planned to meet a shortage of draft animals. 
Subsidiary cooperatives not directly connected with agriculture were 
especially common in the coastal and mountain regions. Member households 
of these associations carried out their own farming on an individual basis, 
but jointly conducted projects such as livestock raising and handicrafts as 
subsidiary activities. These subsidiary cooperatives numbered seventy-one 
when the Korean War ended in July 1953. The total number of cooperatives, 
including agricultural and subsidiary, in rural North Korea in July 1953, 
reportedly reached 174, composed of 2,354 households (Nongop hyop- 
donghwa undong ui sungli, 1958, I:4, and Kajimura 1966a:300). These 
organizations may be seen as incipient forms of the agricultural cooperatives 
that were later developed. 
The Korean War dealt a serious blow to the North Korean economy, 
both rural and urban. Property was damaged and a shortage of agricultural 
labor developed. Urban centers needed much manpower for post-war 
reconstruction and industrialization. War casualties and the southward flow 
of refugees reduced the North Korean population. When the war front moved 
to the northernmost part of Korea, many people in all parts of the country 
who opposed the Communist regime chose to leave North Korea for the 
south. The Korean War aided the Communist regime, however, by helping to 
foster among its subjects a revolutionary ideology and by eliminating the so- 
called reactionary elements. 
In August 1953, one month after the truce, the Communist regime 
called for a major reorganization of rural economy, the cooperativization of 
agriculture. During the following year, which was labeled by the Communists 
as an "experimental stage," an intensive propaganda campaign for 
cooperativization was conducted throughout North Korea. First, each county 
(kun) was ordered to set up two or three cooperatives among the poor 
peasants who were regarded by the Communists as loyal supporters well 
indoctrinated with Communist ideology. Establishment of these early 
cooperatives aimed to demonstrate the superiority of cooperative 
management of agriculture and to educate peasants in the operation of 
cooperatives. By the end of 1953, 1.2% of the peasant households in North 
Korea had been organized into 806 cooperatives. After this experimental 
stage, near the end of 1954 the regime launched a full-scale movement 
toward cooperativization. An existing trend toward giving preferential 
treatment to the cooperatives over individual farmers was intensified during 
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this period. The government gave every possible form of assistance to the 
cooperatives, including preferential treatment by governmental "stations" 
which rented farm machinery, a reduction of taxes-in-kind, loans of grain to 
poor peasants, a supply of urban workers during peak periods in the 
agricultural cycle, and priority over individual farmers in access to seeds of 
high quality produced in state-owned seed farms. 
With this strong support the number of cooperatives increased greatly 
after 1954. At the end of 1954, 31.8% of the peasant households were in 
cooperatives; in December 1955 the number had risen to 49.0%; in 
December 1956, to 80.9%; and at the end of 1957, over 95% of the peasant 
households no longer operated individual farms, By August 1958 the entire 
rural population of North Korea was under the cooperative management 
system. There were then 13,309 cooperatives, with an average of 79 
households and 134 chongbo of arable land each (Choson chungang 
nyon gam 1959: 193 and 330). 
Proclaiming "victory of cooperativization," the regime further con- 
solidated rural economic organization by reducing the number of coop- 
eratives and consolidating them into larger units during the fall of the 
same year. By this measure, 13,309 cooperatives had been reorganized into 
3,843, each of which had an average of 275 households and 456 chongbo of 
arable land. In pre-Communist times the li or hamlet was the smallest 
administrative unit of the nation. Under Communism the li was enlarged to 
include several neighboring hamlets and the "new" li coincided with the 
cooperative farms. 
The merging in North Korea of agricultural cooperatives and the li 
occurred at the time of the completion of the reorganization of rural 
Communist China into People's Communes, and for this reason one might 
conclude that the Chinese development was "promptly echoed by North 
Koreans" (Lee 1963:76). North Koreans were well aware of what was 
happening in Communist China, and they did learn much from this source 
about the collectivization of rural economy. Information about the "Great 
Leap Forward" and the commune movement in Communist China was 
widely dispersed through national propaganda channels. One of North 
Korea's scholars acknowledges that information about collectivization 
movements experienced by Soviet Russia, Communist China, and other 
Communist countries was utilized in the cooperativization movement in 
North Korea (Kim Han-ju 1958:73). We find it difficult, however, to accept 
the notion that North Korea's establishment of cooperatives was an echo of 
the commune movement of Communist China. Statistical evidence (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 1961:62-63) shows that the size of cooperatives in Korea 
had been consistently growing since the movement began, and a number of 
cooperatives had already grown beyond the size of the old li before the 
official merger of small cooperatives. The number of cooperatives with 101 to 
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200 peasant households each was 222 in 1954; 354 in 1955; 1,247 in 1956; 
2,064 in 1957; and 1,074 in 1958. Twenty cooperatives with 201 to 300 
households each existed in 1955; 103 in 1956; 137 in 1957; and 984 in 1958. 
Furthermore, cooperatives with 301 to 400 households numbered 34 in 1957, 
a year before the official merger of small cooperatives. Some of these had 
been organized as large cooperatives from the beginning, whereas others 
were later created by merging. From this evidence, it seems clear that the 
tendency toward forming large cooperatives had already begun in North 
Korea before Communist China launched its campaign of merging 
cooperatives into people's communes. 
At the outset of the cooperativization movement, the North Korean 
regime had proposed three types of cooperative management of agriculture, 
identified as Type I, Type 11, and Type 111 in North Korean documents. In 
fact, these are three stages of the evolutionary transformation from 
individual farming into cooperative management. The three types may be 
called mutual aid teams, semi-socialist cooperatives, and socialist co- 
operatives, and are characterized as foIlows: 
Mutual aid teams (Type I): Each household maintains absolute control over its 
private property including land, draft animals, and agricultural implements. 
Members of the team pool labor and use draft animals and agricultural 
implements communally, while retaining individual management of private 
property. The amount of the contribution by member households is balanced by 
varied compensation to them in the form of produce and/or labor. Mutual aid 
teams are organized on a year-round basis. 
Semi-socialist cooperatives (Type 11): Member households still retain ownership of 
their land, but all the land possessed by member households except a few fruit 
trees and small garden plots is pooled and collectively managed. Draft animals 
and agricultural implements may be purchased by the cooperatives with 
communal funds. Distribution of crops depends on both labor and land 
contributed. When the crops are harvested, some of the produce is set aside for 
payment of taxes-in-kind, production costs including the cost of fertilizer and 
seeds, machinery rental, irrigation facilities, and as funds to be held as common 
reserves for emergencies and for socio-cultural purposes, such as recreation and 
education. The remainder is then divided among the member households, 80% or 
more being allocated on the basis of the labor contributed, and 20% or less 
allocated on the basis of the investment of land. If an owner of land contributes 
less than 120 work days in a year, his right to receive dividends for the investment 
of land is nullified. Income from the joint subsidiary projects is divided solely ac- 
cording to the amount of labor contributed. 
Socialist cooperatives (Type 111): Except for fruit trees, private garden plots, 
livestock (non-draft animals), and bees, all property in land, draft animals and 
major agricultural implements is turned over to cooperative ownership, and all 
farm work and subsidiary production is done collectively. Private ownership of 
land is legally preserved, but it has no bearing on utilization of land and 
distribution of income, since member households are paid solely on the basis of 
labor contributed, after deductions for production costs, taxes-in-kind, common 
reserves, and funds for socio-cultural purposes. (Kim Han-ju 1958: 29-31, and KO 
Sung-hyo 1971: 49-51) 
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These three types of cooperative mechanisms appear to have been 
consciously designed as evolutionary stages of rural social organization. The 
regime recommended that the peasants choose a type which would fit their 
local circumstances and regarded the third type as the "most advanced 
stage," toward which all people should eventually strive. The principle of 
voluntarism advocated by Lenin decades ago was said to have been strictly 
observed in accordance with the ordinance; a campaign promoting increased 
cooperativization was conducted, however. During the early stage, ag- 
ricultural cooperatives were largely initiated by devoted party members 
and poor peasants, leaving the wealthier peasants as individual farmers. 
Evidence strongly suggests that there were clear differences in the people's 
attitudes toward cooperativization according to their socio-economic statuses 
(Hwang et al. 1960:216). Those who were in the lower economic strata after 
the land reform enthusiastically supported the formation of agricultura1 
cooperatives from the beginning. These were largely poor farmers who had 
received some land during the land reform but whose income remained far 
below their needs and who had little to lose by joining cooperatives. Many of 
the "new middle class" farmers also supported cooperativization. These 
consisted of formerly poor people who had become relatively self-sufficient 
after the land reform. Since their present economic condition was almost 
entirely made possible by the policies of the Communist regime, their 
favorable reaction is understandable. Enthusiasm for cooperativization was 
also shown by the families who had lost members in the war and families that 
included war heroes. The new middle class farmers, who had survived the 
land reform with a goodly amount of their land and who maintained living 
standards above those of the average family, generally hesitated and 
remained spectators. The most prosperous farmers strongly opposed 
cooperativization, since it would mean financial loss. 
The formation of "mutual aid teams" was easily accomplished, since 
they do not interfere with individual farming, and Korean peasants were, in 
fact, well-accustomed to such organizations in their traditional mutual aid 
associations. Although the regime suggested three stages of coop- 
erativization, little attention was paid to the formation of "mutual aid 
teams" during the active campaign toward cooperativization. This is 
evidenced by the fact that official North Korean statistics on the progress of 
cooperativization deal with only the second and third types, that is, semi- 
socialist and socialist. Three evolutionary stages of transformation were, it 
seems, not observed in the majority of cases. In many cases, peasants were 
directIy organized from the beginning into the most "advanced" type. 
Documentary material concerning the actual process of coop- 
erativization is abundant. The Central Committee of the North Korean 
Workers' Party compiIed data on the experiences of cooperativization and 
the operation of cooperatives in six volumes entitled Nongop hyopdonghwa 
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undong ui sungli (Victory of the agricultural cooperativization movement), 
published in 1958 and 1959. These compilations contain about ninety case 
studies of individual cooperatives. The first volume deals particularly with 
the developmental process, describing twelve cooperatives. From this volume, 
I have chosen one case study to illustrate the process of transformation, the 
Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative (Volume 1:153-186). This 
particular case study was chosen chiefly because the account is amplified by 
another work (Hwang et al. 1960), an ethnographic study of the same 
cooperative. Using these two sources, I give in the following pages a summary 
of the process, describing how the cooperative came into being, and how 
individual peasants were brought into the cooperative. 
Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative (Cho-Chung 
Ch'inson Nongop Hyopdongchohap) is located in Taek'am-li of Sunan 
County in South P'yongan Province, a plains region north of P'yongyang. 
The cooperative originated in a small hamlet called Sangyang, and was 
known as Sangyang Agricultural Cooperative until late 1959. At the time of 
liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, there were 105 peasant households in 
Sangyang hamlet, including seven large landlords and seven middle peasant 
households. The majority of the village people lived by tenant farming, The 
land reform at once brought about some changes in the village social 
structure. Three of the large landlords were ostracized and moved to other 
communities (Hwang et al. 1960:206), but some of the wealthy families 
survived the land reform, having only their rented lands confiscated. 
Although agricultural laborers and tenants had received some land during 
the land reform, the majority of the people remained poor. At the time of the 
truce in 1953, there were 103 households in the hamlet, among which fewer 
than ten were self-sufficient and about forty lived on grain loans from the 
government. 
At the height of the movement toward cooperativization after the truce, 
the Li Party Committee, composed of devoted party members, organized a 
propaganda campaign. Committee members focused their attention on the 
poor, visiting them to explain party policy and the need for cooperatives, and 
extolling the superiority of cooperative management of agriculture. The 
campaign brought new hope for the poor people, but made the wealthy ones 
uneasy. As expected, the wealthy families opposed cooperativization. Since 
they were still running their large landholdings by seasonally employing poor 
villagers, the formation of cooperatives even among the poor would deal a 
serious blow to them, making it impossible to hire laborers and to rent out 
draft animals and agricultural implements. The self-sufficient middle 
farmers also opposed cooperativization because membership in a cooperative 
on an egalitarian basis with poor families would mean a heavy financial loss. 
Toward the end of 1953, when some signs of willingness to form 
cooperatives were seen, the Li Party leadership took the initiative, and with 
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first ten willing households and two immigrant households, set up Sangyang 
Agricultural Cooperative, the first cooperative of the socialist type to be 
established in South P'yongan Province. All of its members were poor. The 
County People's Committee immediately took every possible measure to 
support the cooperative. In order to boost the members' morale, grain, seeds, 
and needed funds were provided. The cooperative purchased an ox and 
agricultural implements with a loan from the Farmers' Bank. The unit of the 
Chinese People's VoIunteer Army which was then stationed near the hamlet 
also supported the cooperative by delivering 200 tons of horse manure 
directly to the fields in army vehicles. With this substantial support, the 
cooperative had a successful harvest at the end of its first year, producing an 
average of 2.4 tons of rice per chongbo of paddy fields against an average of 
about two tons for the individual farms. The cooperative also produced an 
average of one ton of barley, wheat, and potatoes per chongbo of dry fields 
versus about 700 kilograms for the individual farms. The propaganda 
networks picked up these figures as an important aid in advertising the 
"superiority of cooperative management of agriculture." Peasant households 
still engaging in individual farming carefully watched the operation of the 
cooperative throughout the year. At year's end, many of them, mostly poor 
but a few middle-income, expressed willingness to join the cooperative. By 
now the tendency to favor cooperativization had become a serious threat to 
the wealthy farmers. 
Realizing that there would no longer be a supply of labor if all the poor 
farmers joined the cooperatives, the affluent and some of the middle farmers 
sought a way to survive. They attempted to organize their own cooperative of 
the second or semi-socialist type by recruiting poor families with many able- 
bodied members as a labor force that wouId allow them to continue 
conducting their farms under private ownership. About ten wealthy and 
middle farmers initiated this attempt to establish a new cooperative, 
promising loans of grain and cash to poor farmers if they joined. Signatures 
indicating willingness were given by about twenty poor farmers, and verbal 
promises to join were given by many others who were not members of the 
existing socialist cooperative. During this quiet campaign of recruitment, the 
recruiters concealed the fact that the cooperative was to be semi-socialist 
rather than socialist. In mid-December 1954, the organizers called a meeting 
to form the cooperative. About sixty people attended, during which they 
inquired as to the type of cooperative planned. As the discussion grew heated, 
it became clear that the organizers intended to take advantage of the poor 
farmers, since a semi-socialist cooperative takes into account in its 
distribution of earnings the amount of land invested by members. The 
majority of the people attending the meeting left before it ended and called at 
the office of the year-old Sangyang Agricultural Cooperative, expressing their 
willingness to join it. On the same day, the Sangyang Cooperative called a 
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members' assembly and accepted seventy-eight households as new members. 
The cooperative leaders also continued their attempts to persuade the rich 
and middle farmers to join, and after about two months of continuous effort, 
Sangyang Cooperative had grown to a hundred member households. 
Although rich and middle farmers had joined, they were unhappy about their 
new status and continuously engaged in minor conspiracies to obstruct 
operations. 
During 1955, more outside support was poured into the cooperative. At 
the time of rice transplanting, the county authority sent a labor-assistance 
team of thirty-two office workers and students. Later the central Party 
dispatched to the cooperative on a mission of "concentrated guidance" a 
group of twenty cadre members, who stayed in the village fifteen days giving 
instruction in the cooperative management of agriculture. After the year's 
harvest, which reportedly brought the member households more than twice 
their earlier incomes, the remaining hold-outs, three households of old 
residents and eight of those households moved into the village from other 
parts of the country under the Communist rule, also joined the cooperative. 
Sangyang hamlet was then completely cooperativized with 111 member 
households and 239 working members. 
One year later, in the fall of 1956, the Sangyang Agricultural 
Cooperative merged with four neighboring cooperatives: Pubaek (established 
in the fall of 1954), Taek'am (late 1954), Ponghwajae (fall of 1955), and 
Taegol (early 1956). Since all of these cooperatives were already full socialist 
types, the merger was easily carried out. The unit of the cooperative had now 
become identical with the administrative district or li. During the following 
two years, the cooperative expanded further, absorbing neighboring small- 
scale cooperatives; Sansong and Namch'ang of Ochung-li in late 1957, and 
Sachik-li Che-il, Sachik-li Che-i, and Yonsan Cooperatives in the summer of 
1958. Over 460 households and 800 or more working members were brought 
into a single cooperative. In the fall of 1959, Sangyang Cooperative changed 
its name to "Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative," which was 
apparently named to honor the assistance given by the Chinese People's 
Volunteer Army during its early stage of cooperativization and Chinese 
Premier Chou En-Iai's visit to the farm in February 1958. 
It  should be noted that from its beginning this cooperative was heavily 
indebted for aid to the local and central governments. During the peaks of 
the agricultural cycle each year, labor forces in the county, including office 
workers, students, and military men and their families, were mobilized to 
assist the cooperative. The central government also introduced farm 
machinery, and its agricultural machine station carried out most of the heavy 
work formerly done by draft animals and human labor, such as plowing and 
transporting. Following its usual policy, during the early stage of 
cooperativization the regime lent grain for food, seeds for planting, and 
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funds; reduced taxes-in-kind; and exempted the cooperative from repaying 
its grain loan. All of these measures undoubtedly helped inspire the members 
with zeal to increase production. 
As we have seen from the foregoing case study, the Korea-China 
Friendship Cooperative did not go through the second stage of 
cooperativization, the semi-socialist, but changed directly from the stage of 
mutual aid team to that of socialist cooperative, even though only a small 
portion of the village households were involved at the outset. As noted earlier, 
this course of development appears to be fairly common for other 
cooperatives. According to official North Korean statistics (Agricultural 
Cooperativization in D. P. R. K. 1958:29, 64), the third type (socialist) was 
most common. As early as June 1954 there were 1,091 cooperatives in North 
Korea, of which 54% were already of the third type. In December of that year 
the socialist type composed 78.5% of the 10,098 cooperatives in North Korea. 
After two years of active campaigning, cooperativization had succeeded in 
bringing over 80% of the peasant population into cooperatives, 97.5% 
of which were of the socialist type by December 1956. Although 
cooperativization was formally completed by the fall of 1958, the last two 
years were apparently spent strengthening the organization of the 
cooperatives and picking up remaining stubborn farmers, principally more 
or less wealthy households. 
The problem of voluntary participation was solved largely by removing 
all possible conditions under which individual farming was possible, so that 
the farmers finally gave up their independence and joined. For the weaIthy 
peasants, "voluntarism" consisted, in fact, of "surrendering" their farms. No 
doubt they resisted losing their property, but as cooperativization progressed, 
they had no alternative. Large numbers of laborers were required to run their 
large landholdings, and such labor could no longer be obtained. They could 
no longer practice usury in loans of grain or cash in order to expand their 
wealth or to gain labor. As the formerly poor peasants in the new 
cooperatives improved their financial position, they obtained their own 
agricultural implements and draft animals instead of using those of the rich 
landowners. 
One important technique used to influence farmers was to show them 
the "superiority" of cooperative management. In most cases, cooperatives 
were initiated by a small number of poor farmers. In the early stage, the 
members of cooperatives were undoubtedly poor as compared with the 
remaining independent farmers. Viewing the success of initial cooperatives 
as a building block to successful cooperativization, however, the regime gave 
them strong support. This procedure apparently worked well on the village 
level, and more and more families gave up their individual farms as the 
years passed. 
The rapid development of cooperatives in North Korea may also be 
partially attributed to the fact that, through the land reform in 1946, the 
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majority of land was not in fact at the owners' disposal. As we have already 
seen, the farmers were not allowed to sell, buy, or rent their newly-acquired 
land, even if they were issued ownership certificates. This circumstance 
certainly must have weakened their attitude toward private ownership of 
lands. As we have also noted, the land reform was a first step toward the 
agricultural cooperativization which followed. By giving them free land, the 
land reform helped to gain the support of the poor, who formed the majority 
of the rural population, and the regime relied primarily upon these poor 
people during the initial stage of cooperativization. It  is difficult to find 
record of any cooperatives that have been successfully initiated by the rich 
and middle-class peasants. We have seen an example in the case of the 
Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative of an unsuccessful 
attempt by prosperous farmers to form their own semi-socialist cooperative. 
This case illustrates the wealthy farmers' attitude toward cooperativization. 
A similar example is reported from Sangp'yong-li of Chasong County in 
Chagang Province (Nongop hyopdonghwa undong ui sungli 1958, Vol. 
I:290). 
By the end of 1958, all of rural North Korea had been brought under the 
socialist economy. Since the early small cooperatives were generally units 
composed of families that might or might not be close neighbors, they had to 
cultivate widely scattered lands, an inefficient procedure. Now the ridges 
between small fields, which formerly served as footpaths and boundaries of 
individually-owned lands, were removed. Each cooperative considerably 
reduced the number of distinct units of arable land through readjustment of 
the fields in this way so that farm machinery could be used more effectively. 
The Red Star Agricultural Cooperative (Pulgun-pyol Noagop Hyopdong 
Chohap) (ibid.:217-250) may serve as an  example to illustrate the point, 
During the early stage of cooperativization, two small cooperatives of 
socialist type were formed in a small hamlet called Haboshi. Although 
cooperative members lived in the same village, they were divided into two 
cooperatives when they worked in the fields. Disputes often arose over 
priority in the use of irrigation facilities which the two shared. In at least two 
cases, disputes involved men who were cousins. Members of both 
cooperatives discovered that some work could be done with less manpower by 
merging, and they eventually realized that relatives and neighbors were being 
estranged by the competition of the two cooperatives. In the fall of 1955 the 
two merged, adopting the name Red Star Agricultural Cooperative. 
After the general amalgamation, the cooperatives of North Korea 
became giant corporations, which handled all aspects of rural economy 
including distribution and exchange. Now the enlarged financial scale made 
it possible for cooperatives to purchase modern machinery, such as tractors 
and combines, for use in larger fields. Increased efficiency in the use of 
available labor and means of production improved the materia1 benefits of 
NORTH KOREA IN TRANSITION 35 
the member households. Utilizing labor pools, cooperatives undertook large- 
scale irrigation projects and other construction projects, which further 
boosted production. 
Until cooperativization was completed, the farmer was told to retain his 
Iand in private ownership so that he could be compensated for land invested 
in the cooperatives if he should wish to leave the village. Even this nominal 
right of private ownership was taken away, however, and all land was placed 
under "cooperative ownership" of the members. 
Since the amalgamation to form large units, little has changed in the 
organization of the cooperatives, although some measures have been taken to 
run them more efficiently. The official name of the cooperatives was 
changed, however. In early 1962 (January), the title Nongop Hyopdong 
Chohap (Agricultural Cooperative) became Hyopdong Nongjang (Coop- 
erative Farm). 
3. The Cooperative Farm 
As the preceding pages suggest, the changes in agriculture under 
Communist rule brought many other changes in rural life. The development 
of the cooperative farms may therefore be regarded as an important stage in 
a long process of transformation creating a Communist society. In theory, the 
land is under cooperative ownership. Members of the cooperative farms, who 
form the majority of the rural population, are neither independent farmers, 
like the traditional peasants, nor wage laborers, like the farmers of the state 
farms. Their income depends principally upon the joint results of the work in 
which they have participated. The effects of the establishment of the 
cooperatives on rural North Korean life may be inferred by examining in 
greater detail their structure and modes of operation. I shall first give 
attention to the manner in which the farms are organized. 
The average cooperative farm consists of about 300 farm households 
composed of 1,500 people and has 500 chongbo of arable land. As I have 
noted, the cooperatives correspond with the modern li or hamlet, a unit 
which has expanded under Communist rule to include several neighboring 
hamlets. As an administrative unit the old li played no important role in the 
social life of the villagers. Only the single hamlet, as a residential community, 
had been important in daily life. Unless there were some common concerns 
such as sharing irrigation facilities and neighboring fields, little contact 
existed with the people of neighboring hamlets. It  was common for each 
hamlet to have its own tutelary god, and face-to-face relations with other 
people were ordinarily limited to the members of one's hamlet of residence. 
The merging of several neighboring hamlets into the modern li was more 
than an expansion of the administrative unit. This development strongly 
affected the traditional structure of the rural community. Far beyond the 
traditional functional boundary of a hamlet, which was a residential cluster, 
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the modern li, or cooperative farm, is multifunctional. It controls and 
organizes agriculture and commerce, and also educational, social, political, 
recreational, and welfare activities. The geographically distinct hamlet may 
still exist in some places, but it is no longer an independent entity of social 
life. 
In each li, administrative affairs are carried out by a People's 
Committee, and all the other activities are handled by a Cooperative Farm 
Management Committee, which functions primarily to control agriculture. 
The highest legislative organ or decision-making body of a cooperative farm 
is the Plenary Session, which is attended by all active working members. A 
Delegates' Conference may substitute for the Plenary Session, where or when 
it is difficult to call the Plenary Session because of the distances between 
residential clusters within a farm. In this case, the delegates are elected from 
all segments of a farm. This legislative body is responsible for formulating 
rules governing the operation of a farm and also determines various farm 
policies. Matters handled by the Plenary Session or the Delegates' 
Conference include legislation concerning farm operations; work plans 
relating to production, construction, distribution, exchange, credit, 
education, cultural affairs, and health; an annual settlement of accounts and 
distribution of income; decisions on the size of common financial reserves 
and welfare funds, and the screening of persons to receive welfare funds; the 
organization of work teams and the determination of production targets by 
the teams; supervision of the farm's contracts with outside institutions such 
as the agricultural machine station; the conduct of hearings that concern the 
work of the Cooperative Farm Management Committee and the Auditing 
Committee and the election of members of these two committees; supervision 
of the composition of farm cadres appointed by the Management Committee; 
control over admission to membership, and the withdrawal, punishment, and 
expulsion of members; and the conduct of hearings of reports of the 
Management Committee concerning farm property and financial matters. 
The Cooperative Farm Management Committee is an executive organ of 
the farm concerned primarily with production. The committee is composed 
of fifteen to twenty members, headed by one chairman and one or two vice- 
chairmen. The chairman also holds the chairmanship of the Li People's 
Committee, which concerns itself only with administrative affairs. The 
Management Committee carries out resolutions adopted by the Plenary 
Session or the Delegates' Conference and manages various farming activities. 
It calls the Plenary Session or the Delegates' Conference and appoints and 
dismisses executive cadres. The committee chairman calls at least two 
sessions of the committee each month to discuss the management of farm 
affairs, and he represents the farm in outside relations. 
Supervising the operation of the Management Committee is the 
Auditing Committee, composed of five to fifteen elected members with a 
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term of membership of one or two years. The Auditing Committee oversees 
all activities of the Management Committee including the management of 
farm property, accounting, readjustment of labor credits (nolyogil or work- 
days) in relation to the production target, the management of shops, and 
credit. It also receives and transmits to appropriate channels farmers' 
complaints concerning the work of the Management Committee. The 
Auditing Committee reports on its activities at least once every three months 
and prepares a report of the examination of the annual settlement of 
accounts for the Plenary Session or the Delegates' Conference. 
Each cooperative farm has operational staffs that specialize in various 
aspects of farm affairs. A chief technician is in charge of all aspects of 
agricultural technology. Usually a graduate of an agricultural college, he is 
primarily responsible for the introduction of advanced technology. Under the 
leadership of the chief technician are production guidance workers, 
agricultural specialists of various kinds, and a specialist in animal 
husbandry. Each farm usually has two production guidance workers who 
engage principally in administrative work, The agricultural specialists are 
concerned solely with technical guidance. Each agricultural production work 
team includes at least one agricultural specialist, who usually holds a 
certificate attesting to his proficiency that is issued by the state upon 
completion of a short training program in agricultural technology. Other 
staff members of a farm include a planner-statistician, two to five 
bookkeepers, one or two labor-statisticians, and one or two warehouse 
custodians. Each farm runs various facilities and institutions including a 
credit office, one or more dispensaries, a workers' schooI, a Democratic 
Propaganda Room, nurseries, kindergartens, and a club house. Also 
included are bath houses, which are set up in each residential cluster or for 
each work team. In some instances, a farm has its own cemetery. 
The working members of a farm are organized into "work teams" 
(chagoppan). In general, each cooperative farm has several "agriculturaI 
production work teams" (nongsan chagoppan) and at least one animal 
husbandry work team" (ch'uksan chagoppan). The former includes fifty to a 
hundred members in each team, the latter five to ten members. Besides these 
two kinds of work teams, a farm may have other teams specializing in such 
matters as the raising of fruit and vegetables and sericulture. Each 
agricultural production work team is divided into about five small groups 
called "work sub-teams" (punjo), each of which generally has ten to twenty 
members. Sub-teams of the animal husbandry work teams have only two to 
five members. Work teams may be further divided into specialities, such as 
dry-field sub-teams, paddy-field sub-teams, and pig-raising or rabbit-raising 
sub-teams. 
The work teams and sub-teams are year-round organizations to which 
land, labor forces, livestock, agricultural implements, and draft animals are 
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assigned. Seasonal work organizations called chagopcho, or "work groups" 
are also used. These groups are organized whenever it is necessary to divide 
the sub-teams still further in order to utilize them effectively for specialized 
tasks. The chagopcho of five to seven members is organized among members 
of the larger punjo and includes at least one experienced farmer. For 
example, the chagopcho functions from January to early March in the 
making of bags and rope of straw and the construction of curtains around the 
seedbeds to protect them from cold temperatures. From mid-June to mid- 
October, various tasks that include weeding and harvesting are done by sub- 
units of the chagopcho, each of which takes charge of specified areas of 
fields. Some agricultural work, such as transplanting and threshing rice, 
requires the cooperation or pooling of all available labor, and these tasks are 
carried out by all workers, who are divided into sub-teams. In addition to 
promoting the effective use of labor, the chagopcho has proved to be 
advantageous in letting the farmers bear the responsibility for the results of 
their work, thus stimulating them to improve the quality of their efforts. A 
chart (figure 1) graphically summarizes the organization of a cooperative 
farm into formal units and shows its lines of administrative control. 
In further illustration of the organization of the agricultural cooperative, 
we shall take as an example the Namgu Cooperative Farm in Yomju County 
(Rodong Sinmun, 1/26/66). This cooperative farm has nine work teams, 
including six agricultural work teams (nongsan chagoppan), one animal 
husbandry work team (ch'uksan chagoppan), one fruit-culture work team 
(kwasu chagoppan), and one sericulture work team bangjam chagoppan). 
Each of the teams is divided into sub-teams (punjo), and the sub-teams may 
or may not be further subdivided. On this farm, where the paddy fields 
compose 80% of the arable land and the dry fields only 20%, each 
agricultural production work team is organized with several sub-teams of 
twenty to twenty-five members in charge of paddy fields and at least one sub- 
team specializing in dry fields. Each sub-team is in charge of the entire 
process of production on the lands assigned to it. One of the most difficult 
problems of the farm management committee is the allocation of land to sub- 
teams. Such factors as the fertility of soil in each parcel of land, the distance 
from residential areas, work conditions, and the average yields during the 
past five years are taken into account. In order to maintain a balance 
between quality and quantity for all teams, good and poor parcels of land are 
judiciously allocated. Other necessities, such as draft animals and 
agricultural implements, are also equitably divided among the sub-teams. 
The draft animals are cIassified into four qualitative grades and those of high 
grade are given to the sub-teams in charge of unfavorable pieces of land. 
The animal husbandry work team is assigned lands for producing 
fodder for its animals. The size and organization of its sub-teams are based 
on the number of animals and the conditions of fodder production. The fruit- 
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culture work team is divided into three sub-teams, each of which includes 
sixteen to twenty-three members and is in charge of specified orchards. In 
composing each sub-team, the number of fruit trees and their condition, 
including their age, are taken into account. The sericulture work team 
consists of three sub-teams, each of which includes seventeen members. Each 
member of a sub-team is in charge of a certain number of silkworms, the 
number of which, in turn, depends upon the condition of, and the distances 
to, the fields of mulberry trees, which provide food for the silkworms. 
In general, the allocation of labor to work sub-teams is based primarily 
upon the members' ability to work. More than 85% of the farm laborers and 
over 90% of the total number of able-bodied members are in the agricultural 
production work teams. In other words, the majority of able-bodied men and 
women produce rice and other cereals, whose culture requires relatively hard 
effort (especially paddy field rice). Except for a few able-bodied male core 
members, the sub-teams for dry fields and the specialized work teams for 
fruit-culture and sericulture are composed mainly of females and the aged of 
both sexes. The allocation of labor is based upon actual experience and is 
fairly elaborate. For example, on the basis of the statistical knowledge that 
paddy fields require annually 400 workdays per chongbo and dry fields 244 
workdays per chongbo, the farm authorities have figured that an average 
sub-team member is able to cultivate 0,8 chongbo of paddy field or 1.2 
chongbo of dry field. Taking this figure into account, the allocation is further 
adjusted so as to reflect the fact than an average member of the paddy field 
sub-team, which is composed mainly of able-bodied members, contributes 
annually thirty more workdays than an average member of the dry field sub- 
team. Every effort is made to insure that all able-bodied members and highly 
experienced farmers are equitably allocated among the teams and sub-teams 
in order to avoid possible variations in farmers' incomes other than those due 
to differences in the quality and quantity of the work contributed. When 
possible, members of individual households are assigned to the same sub- 
team. 
As the above example shows, the organization of production units and 
the allocation of means of production are carefully worked out in order to 
mobilize all available human and material resources of the farm for efficient 
production. The Communist regime seems to be fully aware of the influence 
of the mode of organization upon the farmers' morale and their incentives to 
produce. Since morale would be seriously affected if two farmers in different 
production units who had contributed the same number of workdays received 
markedly different incomes, every effort is made to ensure equality in the 
conditions of production. Each year's experiences are carefully scrutinized 
with the aim of improving the manner of organization. At the end of each 
agricultural year, all the units of production and the manner of organization 
are reviewed and, if necessary, reorganized. 
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The circumstances at Namgu Cooperative Farm differ little from those 
described earlier. Depending upon the natural resources and the location of 
the cooperative farms, production is organized so as to maximize returns. 
Each work team is an independent unit in its activities of production and has 
its own facilities for production. In principle, the same is true of each sub- 
team. Sub-teams sometimes work cooperatively, however, a practice which to 
some extent may be seen as an extension of the traditional mutual-aid 
association called pumasi that formerly prevailed throughout rural Korea. 
Among sub-teams concerned with the same crops, inequalities may arise 
during the peaks of agricultural work because of heavy simultaneous 
demands for irrigation and transportation facilities and other farm 
machinery. In such case, the sub-teams organize apumasi by means of which 
they exchange labor on a reciprocal basis. This kind of mutual aid among the 
sub-teams is reported to be extensively employed (Kajimura 1967:17). 
A11 farms do not have all of the specialized work teams we have 
discussed. Many cooperative farms on the outskirts of urban centers raise 
principally cash crops of vegetables. Farms in the plains areas tend to 
specialize in producing cereals. In mountainous areas, animal husbandry, 
fruit-culture, and sericulture are more common. At these cooperative farms, 
work teams called chonghap chagoppan or "general work team" are multi- 
fuctional (Kajimura and Sakurai 1969:16). As its name implies, a general 
work team engages in various kinds of agricultural activities and produces a 
range of products, although its sub-teams may specialize. The general work 
team has apparently proved to be somewhat advantageous for effective year- 
round utilization of manpower, and in recent years a trend has developed 
toward an increase of general work teams. 
The composition of the farm population shows some notable changes 
under the Communist regime. As industrialization and urbanization 
increased, the rural population substantially shrank. We might reasonably 
assume that those who left farms to engage in non-farming jobs in urban 
centers are primarily young able-bodied people, a development that would 
reduce the capacity for agricultural production for lack of young, vigorous 
workers, Counter-balancing measures, however, have been undertaken by 
the Communist regime. There is still a demand for additional farm labor, 
but the mechanization of agriculture, often referred to as the "industrializa- 
tion of agriculture," has reportedly progressed substantially and has par- 
tially met the shortage. The use of weed-killing chemicals, for example, is 
reported to have led to considerable savings in man-hours of labor, and the 
introduction of multi-functional tractors has similarly eased the problem. 
Today, it is quite common to see young women operating tractors, work that 
at first was regarded as suitable only for men. 
Another measure that helped alleviate the farm labor shortage was a 
strong tendency to assign to cooperative farms soldiers who had completed 
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their terms of service, even when they originally came from cities. Today, 
these discharged soldiers are said commonly to form core groups in the 
cooperative farms together with people of poor peasant origin. Since all of 
these former soldiers are members of the Korean Workers' Party and were 
well-disciplined through their military life, which has been called a "school of 
revolution," they are the most trusted and "revolutionary" class of people in 
rural North Korea. They are reported to play the leading role in bringing 
cultural innovations to the farms. The Korea-China Friendship Cooperative 
Farm (Hwang et al. 1960:212-213) serves as an illustrative example. In late 
1959, of a total of 1,227 members, 129 were recently discharged soldiers and 
these men formed the core group of the work force on this farm. More than 
ten of the soldiers served in key positions that included the chairmanship of 
the Socialist Working Youth League, the headship of work teams, and 
various positions of Party leadership on the farm level. 
In connection with the composition of the agricultural Iabor force, a few 
words are necessary regarding the qualifications for membership in a farm. 
In principle, all able-bodied people over sixteen years of age who reside 
within the boundary of a farm are qualified to be farmers. There are two 
classes of farmers, however: full members, called nongiangwon, and 
associate members, called nongiangwon hubo, literally meaning "candidates 
for farm membership." The latter category, associate membership, draws 
our special attention. Qualifications are based upon former social, economic, 
and political statuses. Associate members consist mostly of the class of peo- 
ple regarded as reactionaries or as politically "impure," including former 
landlords, "pro-Japanese," and "pro-American" elements. These associate 
members are denied some civil rights, including the right to vote and 
eligibility for elected office, and they are excluded from any decision-making 
body of the farm. Otherwise they have the same rights as full members. The 
associate members may become full members through devotion to farm and 
other social activities and through hard work. A full membership may be 
revoked, however, if one fails to observe the state ordinances or farm 
regulations or has brought substantial loss to the farm. The full member may 
be either degraded to associate membership or dismissed from membership. 
Finally, let us briefly examine the way in which a cooperative farm is 
integrated in the broader national network of administrative control. Until 
early 1962, when a new administrative organ called the County Cooperative 
Farm Management Committee, or Kun Hyopdong Nongjang Kyongyong 
Wiwonhoe, which specialized in agricultural management and guidance, was 
set up on the county level, cooperative farms in North Korea had been 
administered through the conventional administrative channel, that is, the 
People's Committees on the county, provincial, and state levels. The 
establishment of the County Cooperative Farm Management Committee 
marked the separation of the activities of agricultural production from the 
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administrative sector. The state enterprises that serve the rural economy were 
placed under the direct control of the County Cooperative Farm 
Management Committee. These are agricultural machine stations, 
agricultural machine factories, irrigation control stations, material supply 
agencies, and epizootic disease prevention centers. All individual cooperative 
farms within a county are directly controlled and supervised by the County 
Cooperative Farm Management Committee. This County Committee also 
gives direct technical assistance to the cooperative farms under its 
jurisdiction. For instance, most of the major agricultural machines used in 
farming, including tractors, combines, and trucks, belong to the agricultural 
machine stations run by the County Cooperative Farm Management 
Committee. The Committee assigns the agricultural machines and their 
operators to each farm on a year-round contract. Rental fees for the 
machines depend upon the quantity of work carried out with the help of the 
machinery and also the quality of the produce raised with the aid of the 
machinery. 
Beyond the level of the county, the County Cooperative Farm 
Management Committees within a province are controlled and supervised by 
the Provincial Rural Management Committee, or To Nongchon Kyongli 
Wiwonhoe. In addition to the cooperative farms, the Provincial Rural 
Management Committee directly runs the state farms or kugyong nongiang. 
At the top of the hierarchy is the Central Agricultural Commission, or 
Chungang Nongop Wiwonhoe. This is the supreme organizer of the entire 
operation of agricultural production in North Korea. Following the recent 
trend toward decentralization of administrative organs related to 
agricultural production and guidance, the roles of the Central Agricultural 
Commission have been greatly reduced, thus heavily strengthening the roles 
of County Cooperative Farm Management Committees. The Central 
Commission retains chief responsibility for the advancement of agricultural 
production, running various agricultural research and experimental 
institutes. Activities under the Central Commission's charge include the 
improvement of farm machines, selection of seeds, improvement of soil 
fertility, the supply of fertilizers, animal husbandry, rural by-products, 
training of agricultural specialists, and large-scale "nature rebuilding" 
projects such as reforestation, establishment of shelter-belts, and bringing 
tidelands under cultivation (Kajimura and Sakurai 1969:21). 
The numerous changes may be summarized briefly. The former 
independent peasants have become rural proletarians, under a national 
scheme of organization. The traditional division of labor has changed 
greatly. Each working member of the farm is now in charge of a specific 
portion of the farm work. A household does not exist as an independent unit 
of production; its members play various roles in farm affairs without 
reference to the households to which they belong. Unlike the traditionally 
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loosely-organized village structure, it appears that the cooperative farm as a 
whole functions in the manner of a single large household. 
4. Technological Innovations 
The division of Korea in 1945 left North Korea with insufficient arable 
land to feed her population by use of the farming technology of the time. The 
mountainous terrain and unfavorably cold climate were serious handicaps. 
Under Communism, heavy emphasis was first placed upon industrial rather 
than agricultural development to save the national economy. The priority 
given to industrialization drew considerable manpower from the rural sector; 
and the additional shortages of arable land and manpower then strongly 
stimulated the development of agricultural technology. So long as land 
remained under private ownership, however, it was almost impossible for 
small-scale farmers to adopt modern technology. The state farms could do 
so, and they played the major role in furthering farming technology, It was 
only after cooperativization was completed that advanced technology, 
especially in farm machinery, became general in North Korea. 
One of the most celebrated slogans in the economic development of 
North Korea was the phrase "technological revolution," which called for the 
successful completion of four basic tasks: the development of elaborate 
irrigation systems, the mechanization of farm labor, electrification, and 
"chemicalization" or the increased use of agricultural chemicals. Completion 
of these projects would have been impossible without great financial support 
from the central government. It is noteworthy that the goal of effecting a 
"technological revolution" has been officially interpreted to mean 
"industrializing agriculture" (Kim 11-sung 1970,111:430). 
An assessment of the state of "technological revolution" in 1969 
concludes that the task of developing irrigation systems had then been 
"basically" completed (ibid.:431). This project was carried out under the 
slogan "Task for the Rebuilding of Nature" and entailed a massive 
mobilization of labor. At first work was limited to the construction of an 
irrigation network of paddy fields, reservoirs, and dikes. Recently, efforts 
have been made to extend irrigation to some dry fields. Construction of 
reservoirs had long been one of the peasants' dreams in North Korea, where 
the average rainfall per year ranges from about 800 to 1,400 mm., of which 
about 60% falls during the months of July and August (Kawagoe 1970:108). 
The numerous reservoirs now existing in North Korea are effective against 
drought and in increasing productivity. A leading example of the modern 
irrigation systems is the much-celebrated Kiyang Suli Ch'egye, or Kiyang 
Irrigation System, which pumps water from Taedong River into the Taesong 
Reservoir in two stages: first, by ten pumps through ten pipes of one meter in 
diameter and up to thirteen meters in height, and second, by ten pumps 
through ten pipes of .9 meter in diameter and up to 47 meters in height. 
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Through dikes of about 1,000 kilometers, the Taesong Reservoir supplies 
water to approximately 51,000 hectares of land divided into 109 cooperative 
farms, in twenty-six counties and cities. Water is pumped to high lands at 
more than 300 pumping stations (Uchino 1968, No. 1; See also Korea Today, 
No. 86:21-23, July 1963). The Yongsong Cooperative Farm, located in the 
suburb of P'yongyang, is one of the beneficiaries of the Kiyang Irrigation 
System. Water is pumped from the Taesong Reservoir to the highlands at a 
height of 150 meters through five stages of pumping (Uchino 1968, NO. 2). 
Today the Kiyang Irrigation System has become a symbol of the success of 
the "Task for the Rebuilding of Nature." The North Koreans are proud of 
their roles in changing nature, claiming that "in the past, water flowed from 
top to bottom, but today it flows from bottom to top" (Uchino 1968, No. 1; 
Kawagoe 1970: 109). 
The introduction of sprinkling devices known as punsusik kwangye 
ch'egye is another example of efforts to save agriculture from drought and 
to promote productivity. Through pipelines installed deep in the ground, 
water is supplied to the fields, especially to vegetable gardens. Installation of 
this system was very expensive, but its advantages in increasing production 
have been very great. Before the introduction of the sprinkler systems, 6,000 
to 7,000 chongbo of land were required to supply vegetables to P'yongyang 
City. Today, with the sprinkler system, only 2,000 to 3,000 chongbo of land 
are necessary. The resulting savings, in this urban area alone, come to some 
4,000 chongbo of arable land, which is equal to the area of arable land in the 
average county (Kim 11-sung 1970, III:428). 
Traditionally, oxen were the only draft animals used in Korean farming. 
Horses were rarely used. Except for plowing and the pulling of vehicles, farm 
work was done manually. In 1948 a very few tractors were imported into rural 
North Korea (Sakurai 1965:68). They proved to be impractical, since the 
lands were still under individual ownership and peasants found no need for 
the expensive machinery to replace their oxen. It was only on state farms and 
other state enterprises that tractors were then utilized. In early 1950, the 
Communist regime set up five Nonggigye Imgyongso or "Agriculture 
Machine-Hire Stations" with a total of seventy tractors to provide 
mechanical labor for needy farmers. During the Korean War (1950-1953), 
which cost rural North Korea heavily in manpower and oxen, the machine- 
hire stations appear to have become firmly established, and the number of 
stations and tractors has since increased rapidly. When cooperativization was 
completed in late 1958, the number of stations had increased to seventy, with 
a total of 1,211 tractors. Two years later, in 1960, the number of tractors had 
reached 5,214, at eighty-nine stations (Sakurai 196570). 
The rapid increase in the number of tractors may be attributed to the 
fact that North Korea had begun active mass production of tractors with her 
own technology and materials in 1959. According to Sakurai, writing in 1965, 
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North Korea had manufactured about 3,000 tractors of approximately thirty 
horsepower each year since 1960 (ibid.:73). This figure seems later to have 
been far exceeded, however, since Kim 11-sung (1970, III:432-433) believes 
that by 1969 the capacity of tractor manufacture had reached 10,000 per 
year, with tractors still in great demand. Although rapid industrialization is 
primarily responsible for the increased supply of modern agricultural 
machinery, cooperativization of agriculture created the demand. 
The impact of tractors on North Korean agriculture was tremendous. 
These machines have taken over most of the hard manual labor of former 
times. The tractors are especially designed for multiple use. Combined with 
various attachments, a single tractor does the plowing, seeding, weeding, 
harvesting, threshing, irrigation, pumping, silage cutting, sawing, and 
transporting. The consequently reduced need for labor undoubtedly helps 
explain the great reduction of the farming population. According to official 
statistics, only 42.8% of the total manpower in North Korea was engaged in 
farming (as members of agricultural cooperatives) in 1963, whereas 74.1% of 
the population had been peasant farmers in 1946. Thus, during this interval 
of seventeen years, over 31% of the total labor force had left rural 
occupations (Central Bureau of Statistics 1965:7). 
The use of tractors has its own limits, due to field conditions. In sandy 
fields and in mountainous areas where fields slope fifteen degrees or more, 
tractors cannot be used. Of 1.9 million chongbo of arable land in North 
Korea, a little over one-third (0.7 million chongbo) was apparently 
unsuitable for the use of tractors (Sakurai 196572). Improving techniques of 
transplanting rice, which requires much manual Iabor for a short period of 
time, has been one of the major tasks of agricultural technology in order to 
meet the manpower shortage. Mechanization now seems to be in sight. A 
recent report (Spurr 1974:49) states that North Korea has made good 
progress in designing rice transplanters, which were reported to be handling 
30% of the crop in the spring of 1974. There is also some indication that 
Communist authorities have tried to experiment with direct seeding of rice 
without transplanting, but so far satisfactory techniques do not appear to 
have been developed (Kim 11-sung 1970, III:432). 
The number of trucks in use is impressive. According to a report in the 
Rodong Sinmun (11/10/70), during 1961-1969 the number of trucks in rural 
North Korea increased 6.4 times. 
Mechanization of agriculture has, of course, reduced the importance of 
draft-animals in rural North Korea. Oxen are still used fairly extensively, 
however, especially in areas where conditions of the land disfavor machines. 
Among the four main tasks of the "rural technological revolution," the 
goal of electrification has been most successfully reached, and electrification 
has possibly reached the level of that of other advanced nations (Rodong 
Sinmun, 11/3/70). In the spring of 1969, 91.2% of North Korean farm 
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households were reportedly equipped with electricity (Kawagoe 1970:108). In 
addition to improving conditions of daily life, electrification has been 
important in reaching toward the other goals of the "rural technological 
revolution," that is, the development of irrigation and mechanization in 
general. Without electric power, for example, the complex irrigation systems 
could not have been established. Today all farm work that is done at fixed 
sites, such as threshing, pumping, and silage processing, is carried out by 
electric power. 
Considerable progress appears to have been made in reaching the goal 
of increasing the supply of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals. The use of 
fertilizer per chongbo, only 131 kilograms in 1949, was over 500 kilograms in 
1969 (Central Bureau of Statistics 196521 and Kawagoe 1970:109). The 
supply of agricultural chemicals other than fertilizers, such as insecticides 
and weed killers, is reported to have increased greatly in recent years. In 
former times, weeding demanded much human labor. 
In addition to the governmentally sponsored changes made under the 
name of the "technological revolution," a number of grassroots technological 
innovations also occurred and have become generally established. The 
technique of shifting soil to improve its fertility, known as hukkari, is one of 
these grassroots innovations. In order to revitalize the soil, farmers are 
encouraged to turn the topsoil over. This does not mean plowing, which can 
be easily done, but involves a complete turn-over of topsoil to a considerable 
depth once every few years so that the "exhausted" soil is replaced at the 
surface by rich soil. This job is largely done by human labor, and takes a 
considerable amount of manpower. It  seems that the farmers do not mind the 
cost of human labor if it results in better returns. Revitalization of the soil 
may also be achieved by mixing poor local soil with better soil brought from 
elsewhere. This type of revitalization of the soil, known as kaekt'o chagop, is 
especially common in areas where the native soil is too sandy to be suitable 
for rice farming; soil of high quality is brought in and a suitable mixture is 
created. 
Changing the soil is not new, but since it requires much labor, it was 
seldom practiced in pre-Communist days. Today, under the cooperative 
management of agriculture, the practice has become common and is one of 
the techniques promoted by the agricultural campaign to improve soil 
fertility and produce better crops. This campaign takes place during the 
winter season between the end of harvest and the beginning of spring 
plowing, as part of the preparation for next year's farming. 
Another technique to enrich the soil is known as sot'o chagop, literally, 
"soil-baking work," and seems to be based upon the same idea as slash-and- 
burn agriculture. The procedure is quite simple: soil is spread thinly on 
firewood, brush, or, more commonly, grain stalks, and the latter are ignited. 
This heat treatment is also accomplished by putting small amounts of soil on 
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the fire in the kitchen stove while preparing meals everyday, thus saving fuel 
and at the same time treating the soil. The soil so treated is collected at 
regular intervals and spread on the fields. Outside baking is done chiefly 
during the slack winter season and the stove treatment continues throughout 
the year. The treatment is said to remove all harmful elements from the soil 
and to protect it from excessive acidification. To some extent, the baked soil 
functions as a chemical fertilizer, and is said to strengthen roots. Soil that 
has been treated in this way is reported to be especially effective in the rice 
seed-beds and in raising corn. According to one source, the application of 
baked soil has been successful in increasing production. By capitalist stan- 
dards, i t  may be difficult to find any notable advantages of these efforts to 
improve soil fertility, with respect to amount of labor input, but they un- 
doubtedly increase productivity. 
Other new agricultural techniques have developed or have been bor- 
rowed from other nations. Two examples are naengsangrno or "cold seed- 
bed'' and lnyonhwa yongyangdanji kasikpop or "cotton nursery method," 
which are notable because they attempt to control the natural environment 
by technology. The "cold seed-bed" is used for rice. Traditionally, the 
cultivation of rice, the principal national food, had been concentrated chiefly 
in the south. The cold weather and a relatively short warm season had limited 
rice cultivation in northern Korea, which faced a severe rice shortage after 
the division of the nation. It  is difficult to discern when the "cold seed-bed" 
technique began in North Korea. It  seems, however, likely that it had not 
been widely known to North Korean farmers until the mid-1950s. According 
to Kim Han-ju (195858-59), the cold seed-bed became widely introduced in 
North Korea by 1957, when it was used in 10.7% of total paddy field. 
Preparation of the "cold seed-bed" requires considerable labor and 
material. In order to protect the seedlings from the cold, the seed-bed is 
covered with oiled paper or vinyl, allowing the seeds to be planted several 
weeks earlier than the old technique permitted. The seedlings are 
transplanted from the seed-bed into the fields in about one-and-a-half 
months. Transplanting is completed around the middle of May, which is a 
little over one month earlier than previously (Kim 11-ch'ul 1959:ll). Use of 
the cold seed-bed has several advantages. It makes the seedlings strong and 
healthy, and provides additional time for growth, thus allowing successful 
cultivation in the northern climate. In addition, the method helps reduce 
considerably the amount of seed required, According to an informant who 
has had actual experience in rural North Korea, a seedling grown in the cold 
seed-bed grows after transplanting to have almost ninety stalks, a much 
larger plant than earlier practices yielded. Today, the use of the cold seed- 
bed is said to prevail throughout North Korea and is claimed to have resulted 
in greatly increased rice production. 
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The technique called "cotton nursery" began in the late 1950s. Except 
in a small region, the climate of North Korea is too cold for the cultivation of 
cotton. After the division of Korea, the shortage of cotton was acute in North 
Korea. One solution was the "cotton nursery" method of cultivation, which, 
unlike the conventional method of planting seeds in the fields, calls for the 
cultivation of seedlings for transplanting. The nursery is filled with humus 
and covered with oiled paper or vinyl for warmth. As compared with direct 
seeding, this new method also requires a considerable amount of additional 
labor. It is claimed, however, that the method not only has proven to be 
productive, but also has enabled North Korea to expand its area of cotton 
cultivation to the far northern part of the country. Although recent 
developments in the synthetic textile industry may have considerably 
weakened the importance of cotton production, the innovation demonstrates 
the determination to increase production even when doing so requires added 
labor. 
These two methods of cultivation are often called "the advanced 
productive farming methods" or sonjinjok tasuhwak nongpop, and both 
require several times more labor than was needed by earlier methods. Since 
these tasks are done in the later winter well before the beginning of the 
heavier spring farm work, they utilize manpower that would otherwise be 
wasted and cause no conflict with other farming procedures. As these two 
methods well exemplify, the goal of increasing production has been a matter 
of great concern. 
The circumstances described above lead us to believe that these 
innovations are chiefly concerned with making use of all potential resources, 
technological, material, and human, for the goal of increased production. It 
is true that much of the agricultural development in North Korea is due to 
the "rural technological revolution," but development has also been greatly 
spurred by utilizing all available human resources, in particular farm 
workers, who have exerted themselves to the utmost to increase productivity. 
